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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID DELL DRAGE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960100-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following are set forth in full in addendum A: 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE SEARCH OF ALL PERSONS PRESENT DURING 
THE WARRANT EXECUTION WAS UNREASONABLE. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point One, pp. 7-
16) 
A, THE POLICE COULD HAVE, AND SHOULD HAVE 
REQUESTED AN "ALL PERSONS PRESENT" 
WARRANT IF THEY DESIRED TO SEARCH 
EVERYONE PRESENT. 
Although the State glosses over the fact, what actually 
occurred during the warrant execution here was a complete search of 
every individual present, by pat down, "checking their pockets," 
"and finding out what kinds of things they had in their pockets and 
on their persons." R. 130. Correctional Officer Smilker, the 
officer who searched Mr. Drage, testified that standard procedure 
during execution of a search warrant is to handcuff all persons 
present, and search them, including going through their wallets. 
R. 143. 
We are not dealing here with just a pat-down. Rather, 
the pat-down theory is an after-the-fact rationale advanced by the 
State to justify otherwise illegal police conduct. 
Utah has recognized and approved the constitutionality of 
"all persons present" search warrants. State v. Covington, 904 
P.2d 209 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Dovle, 918 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 
1996) . Given that the police fully intended to search everyone 
present, it is inexcusable that the warrant application failed to 
seek the magistrate's approval to search all persons present. 
B. IN APPROVING THE SEARCH HERE, THE TRIAL 
COURT RELIED ON NOTHING OUTSIDE THE BARE 
ALLEGATIONS OF THE SEARCH WARRANT 
AFFIDAVIT, EFFECTIVELY APPROVING AN "ALL 
PERSONS PRESENT" WARRANT WHERE NONE WAS 
EVEN REQUESTED. 
In its brief, the State quotes the trial court's ruling: 
[The officers] have to have clear guidance and it seems 
to me that once they're justified for the no-knock and 
once they have a warrant that suggests that there's drug 
use, drug dealing and fugitives and all that accompanied 
in this warrant, when they go in the officers can both 
secure the parties that are there to assure [sic] their 
safety and assure the public's safety and to assure that 
there would be no destruction of evidence. And as part 
of that they can also do at least a pat-down search. 
State's brief at 15 (emphasis by the State). Contrary to the 
State's assertion, this finding is not limited to the facts of this 
case. The trial court did not rely on anything discovered during 
the warrant execution; rather, his ruling is based entirely on the 
warrant application. 
Even though not requested in the warrant application, the 
trial court held that the warrant justified the search of all 
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persons present. This ruling must be reversed. Covington and 
Doyle lay out the requirements for obtaining an all persons present 
warrant. If that is what the police wanted, then they should have 
specifically sought such authority and subjected the request to the 
scrutiny of an impartial magistrate. 
C. AFTER BEING HANDCUFFED, ANY NEED FOR A 
FRISK HAD COMPLETELY DISSIPATED. 
The record discloses uncontroverted evidence that Mr. 
Drage was handcuffed prior to being searched. R. 104 (testimony of 
Officer Metcalf, who observed the search of Mr. Drage), 141 
(testimony of searching Officer Smilker). Given that the police 
officers outnumbered the occupants, R. 12 0-1, 12 8-9, 142, Mr. Drage 
was secured, R. 104, 141, no weapons were produced, R. 144, and no 
weapons were mentioned, R. 144, there was no basis or need for a 
weapons frisk. " [I]nvestigating officers must employ the least 
intrusive means reasonably available to effect the purpose of the 
stop." State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 675 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 
1325-6, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). The officers could have had one 
officer watch each handcuffed detainee, and still had two officers 
free to search the premises. Safety did not require a search of 
each detainee. The officers were no longer concerned with safety. 
Instead, they were searching for contraband. 
D. THE STATE'S ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH YBARRA 
ON ITS FACTS IS UNPERSUASIVE. 
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The State makes far too much of the distinction between 
a public tavern and a private residence. The Supreme Court in 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 
(1979), draws no such distinction: 
Emphasizing the important governmental interest "in 
effectively controlling traffic in dangerous, hard drugs" 
and the ease with which the evidence of narcotics 
possession may be concealed or moved around from person 
to person, the State contends that the Terry "reasonable 
belief or suspicion" standard should be made applicable 
to aid the evidence-gathering function of the search 
warrant. More precisely, we are asked to construe the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to permit evidence 
searches of persons who, at the commencement of the 
search, are on "compact" premises subject to a search 
warrant, at least where the police have a "reasonable 
belief" that such persons "are connected with" drug 
trafficking and "may be concealing or carrying away the 
contraband." 
Over 3 0 years ago, the Court rejected a similar 
argument in United States v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 
583-587, 68 S.Ct. 222, 223-225, 92 L.Ed. 210. 
Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 94, 100 S.Ct. at 343-4. 
The State's reliance on Professor LaFave's observations 
is of no assistance. His opinion that "Ybarra will not be the last 
word," Lafave, Search and Seizure § 4.9(d) at 640 (1996), is simply 
irrelevant. At this point in time, Ybarra is the last word. 
Surely the State does not mean to imply that a panel of a state 
intermediate appellate court can overrule the United States Supreme 
Court on a question of federal constitutional law. 
Ybarra notes that the fourth amendment requires 
individualized suspicion to justify an intrusion. 444 U.S. at 91-
3 . The State relies on nothing more than the information presented 
in the search warrant affidavit. See State's brief at 13. 
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The two cases relied on by the State, People v. Thurman, 
209 Cal.App.3d 817, 257 Cal.Rptr. 517 (1989) and State v. Altamont, 
577 A.2d 665 (R.I. 1990), represent a minority view and should be 
rejected. The private/public distinction is untenable, and must be 
rejected. 
In State v. Lambert, 710 P.2d 693 (Kan. 1985) the court 
was faced with a narcotics search warrant for a private apartment. 
The purse of a visitor was searched, revealing drugs. The Kansas 
court declined to draw any distinction between private and public 
places subject to warrant searches: 
We agree that the principles stated in Terry and Ybarra 
apply equally to searches conducted on private property 
or on property open to the public. 
Lambert, 710 P.2d at 697. Accord State v. Weber, 668 P.2d 475, 477 
(Or. 1983) ("We see no reason why the principles announced in Terry 
and Ybarra should not apply equally to pat-down searches conducted 
on private property and on property open to the public") ; Lippert 
v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) ("The private 
versus public distinction is fallacious and ignores the real 
teachings of Ybarra."). 
Countless cases apply Ybarra to searches conducted on 
private premises not open to the public. E.g., United States v. 
Ward/ 682 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1982) (frisk of bookmaker at his 
residence); United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157, 161-2 (8th Cir. 
1981) (no right to frisk person who arrived on premises during 
warrant execution; visitor should be given opportunity to explain 
presence on premises; court rejects premise that automatic frisk is 
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appropriate based solely on fact that a narcotics search is 
proceeding); United States v. Cole, 628 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1980) 
("The officer's pat-down of appellant cannot be justified by 
appellant's mere presence on the premises during the execution of 
the warrant," citing Ybarra), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 1043 (1981); 
State v. Grant, 361 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1985) (no grounds to search 
purse of woman entering premises with groceries while search 
underway); State v. Myers, 637 P.2d 1360 (Or. 1981) (no grounds to 
frisk guest at premises where marijuana found, odor of marijuana 
was apparent, and drugs were found in plain view); Commonwealth v. 
Luddy, 422 A.2d 601 (1980) (brother of persons named in warrant, 
who was present and working at premises, could not be frisked), 
cert, denied, 454 U.S. 825 (1981); State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96 
(Wash. 1982) (Ybarra controls where person present in private 
residence is searched during narcotic warrant execution); State v. 
Vandiver, 891 P.2d 350 (Kan. 1995) (frisk of visitors during drug 
warrant execution was unjustified because not premised on 
articulable facts giving rise to reasonable belief that the 
visitors were armed and dangerous). 
Ybarra and State v. White, 856 P. 2d 656 (Utah App. 1993) 
(drug use does not warrant automatic frisk) are on point and 
control here, notwithstanding aberrant results from appellate 
courts in California and Rhode Island. 
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POINT II. THE STATE HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE 
TRIA: COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE WAS 
PARA^ ERNALIA IN PLAIN VIEW IS NOT AGAINST THE 
CLEA. WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point Three, pp. 
18-21) 
The State's basic premise is that the trial court's 
credibility determination ends the inquiry with respect to whether 
the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous. If the State is to 
be believed, any credibility determination effectively insulates 
factual findings from any type of review. To the contrary, the 
credibility determination is merely the starting point. Despite 
the trial court's credibility determination, the court's finding 
that there was plain view paraphernalia is against the clear weight 
of the evidence. See Mr. Drage's opening brief at pp. 15-23. The 
State fails to argue otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Drage respectfully requests that the trial court's 
order denying his motion to suppress be reversed, and that the 
trial court be ordered to allow him to withdraw his conditional 
guilty plea. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden--Issuance of 
warrant.3 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
The fourth amendment to the federal constitution 
provides: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
